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Abstract: Migration is an international phenomenon and contentious concept. Although people have 
been moving by political, economic and cultural motivations since the beginning of the human history; 
particularly recently, migration fuels traditional fears over national and societal security. Because, 
migration, a normal or typical political issue can be altered to a security threat by repetitive and 
successful speech acts. This fact has often been referred to as ‘the securitization of migration’, which 
means the presentation of migration as a security threat. In this regard, the arrival of more than one 
million refugees to the EU in 2015 -Migrant (Refugee) Crisis- constitutes an important milestone. The 
starting point of this study is to depict “How the securitization process of the ‘Migrant Crisis’ was 
operated”. It will be in charge of defining not only the key-concepts, such as “securitization move” and 
“securitization”, but also of what are the success criteria are. According to this study, securitizing actors 
and their speech acts have opened the way for the success of securitization by providing the perfect 
ground for altering the question of Migrants into a survival issue. To analyze the characteristics and the 
implications of securitizing the migration issue within the EU, this article primarily engages with the 
theoretical approach developed by the so-called Copenhagen School, which outlines how issues become 
threats those need to be handled by extra-ordinary measures.  
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Resumen: La migración es un fenómeno internacional y un concepto polémico. Aunque las personas se 
han trasladado por motivos políticos, económicos o culturales a lo largo de los siglos; la migración 
alimenta en la actualidad antiguos temores sobre seguridad nacional y social. Dado que la migración, un 
problema político normal, puede transformarse en  amenaza de seguridad por cómo se habla de él -actos 
de habla-.Este  hecho se ha denominado a menudo como "la seguritización de la migración"; es decir, el 
considerar la migración como una amenaza existencial. En este sentido, la llegada de más de un millón 
de refugiados a la UE en 2015, la crisis de los inmigrantes (refugiados), constituye un hito importante. El 
punto de partida de este estudio es describir "Cómo se llevó a cabo el proceso de seguritización de la 
'Crisis Migratoria'". Se tratará de definir no solo conceptos claves, como "seguritización" y "acto de 
habla", sino también cuáles son los criterios que contribuyen a construir con éxito dicha seguritización. 
Según el presente estudio, actores securitizadores y sus actos de habla han abierto el camino para su 
triunfo, al proporcionar el terreno perfecto para transformar la cuestión de los migrantes  en una cuestión 
de supervivencia. Para analizar las características y las implicaciones de la seguritización de la cuestión 
migratoria dentro de la UE, este trabajo aborda principalmente el enfoque teórico desarrollado por la 
llamada Escuela de Copenhague, que describe cómo los problemas se convierten en amenazas que deben 
manejarse con medidas extraordinarias. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Migration is a worldwide phenomenon and for ages there are people on the 
move. People have been moving not only by political and economic motivations, 
but also by environmental and cultural concerns and this makes migration an 
integral part of human history. But in recent years the volume, orientation and 
characteristics of migration have transformed in such a way that, many consider 
migration to be the most important issue facing the world. Even though, the global 
trend of migration remains intra-continental and industrialized countries hosts small 
per cent of displaced people, this does not avoid sparking heated political debates 
particularly in Europe. Some argues that migration has major benefits, but many 
other blame the migration for being the Trojan horse of crime, terrorism, infectious 
diseases, political instability, cultural erosion and economic collapse. Accordingly, 
presentation of distorted view of migration fuelled the arguments that immigrants 
have the potential to threaten the internal security (through increasing crime and 
disorder), societal security (through challenging the white-Christian values) and 
economic security (through taking jobs and social funds from the native-born). This 
leads to the ‘securitization of migration’ and results with shaping the dominant 
discourse solely through security-related vocabulary.  
In fact, securitization of migration is not an issue that Europe is unfamiliar 
with. During the first years of the post-Cold War era and in the wake of the terrorist 
incidents in 2001, migration and security were considered as inter-connected. 
Nevertheless; Europe Migrant Crisis1 in 2015 -the arrival of more than one million 
people to the European territories (The UN Refugee Agency, 2015) gave an extra 
stimulus, which provoked harsher policy orientations in Europe, otherwise would 
have met with greater opposition. The Europe Migrant Crisis became the European 
Union’s (EU) primary challenge since the euro crisis had come out and a variety of 
security-related rhetoric and practices emerged. Consequently, it may not be 
irrelevant to mark the year 2015 as the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new 
one. The old framework and the old understanding of migration and security came 
into question with the emergence of such an unexpected reality. Whether the threat 
is real or not, migration has become an important subject of security studies, as 
migration was linked to security in the most extreme way.  
                                                 
1The tragic incidents in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 called large media coverage and the problem 
became serious enough to be considered as crisis. However, there is a “conflict” over the words used to 
refer to the same crisis. In general, “Migrant Crisis” is used as a neutral term by many Western media 
organizations. However, some other media organizations such as al-Jazeera decided not to use migrant 
and instead say “refugee". Further information is available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
34061097>. In addition, some also use “Mediterranean Migrant Crisis”, “European Migrant Crisis” or 
“Syrian Refugee Crisis” since the vast majority of the refugees was primarily from Syria. 
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The present paper aims to test the validity of the securitization paradigm 
applied to the 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis. This will be done vis-à-vis the question: 
whether and how migration -a non-traditional security sector- has been evoked and 
transformed as a top priority security issue at European level in 2015. To answer 
this question, three sub-questions will be asked:  
1. Did a securitizing move occur during the 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis? 
2. If so, was the securitizing move accepted by the target audience? 
3. If migration issue was successfully securitized, any emergency policies 
were also put into effect?  
This study attempts to map the whole process according to the three steps 
outlined in the securitization framework developed by the so-called Copenhagen 
School (CS): identification of existential threats; emergency action; and effects on 
inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan, et.al., 1998: 6). Most 
importantly, practices of security actors will be examined to figure out not why; but, 
how they securitize this issue. The CS, approaches to securitization negatively, 
since it means a shift from regular, democratic principles and rule of law; and 
affirms de-securitization (downgrading the exceptional measures and placing the 
referent object into the realm that is inside of normal politics). However, this will be 
excluded from this study due to scope and the whole focus will be put on the 
securitization process.  
The 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis is particularly selected for its likelihood to 
illustrate securitization characteristics, because of its ‘crisis’ nature and it is 
anticipated that unprecedented panic facilitated the conditions for successful 
securitization. In applying securitization theory as an analytical framework, this 
study intends to enhance the understanding of the complexity of the securitization 
paradigm and depicts the 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis from a different perspective. 
This study aims to show the process, in which language is used to construct the 
migration issue as a question that requires immediate legal and practical measures. 
Plus, it is expected the prove that securitization acts are not exclusively reserved for 
states and military affairs, but rather it would be applicable to non-state actors (EU) 
and non-military issues (migration) as well. The knowledge from this empirical case 
will contribute to adapting the same pattern into similar cases too.  
When studying migration, terminology matters, since the debate on 
terminology is not only a question of political correctness, but it has also real 
implications on migrants. Many people including the general public, academia and 
public officials reduce migrants into two broad categories: the "legal" and the 
"illegal". The dichotomy is not only false (Not people, but the acts can be illegal), 
but also unethical since the word "illegal" implies a legal conclusion (Pace and 
Severance, 2006: 69). In this study, the term “migrant” is used as a generic title to 
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encompass all other terms such as emigrant, immigrant, irregular migrant, 
undocumented immigrant, refugee, asylum-seeker etc.2  
Essentially, this study is conducted in an exploratory and epistemological 
position which allows room for interpretation and provides empirical evidence on 
the linkage between migration and security. The indispensable component of 
securitization theory, speech act/discourse, is examined by browsing into the official 
documents and public discourse of the political actors in the media. The reference 
media sources are selected for practical reasons for English language, online 
accessibility and reputation. Even though this research is done mainly through a 
qualitative methodological approach, public opinion surveys and filtration of 
specific keywords in EU policy documents (discourse analysis) are also used to 
understand the process better.  
Since the process is analyzed from a macro perspective, this study especially 
takes into account the decisions taken at European level and the discourse of 
decision-makers from either EU institutions or Member States. Correspondingly, all 
other national or trans-border actors such as civil society organizations, private 
military/security companies, the general public, radical right movements, media and 
so forth had to be left out to some extent. In order to prevent this study from 
becoming too broad, only the year 2015 in which the amount of migration reached 
the largest in the 21st century was taken into consideration. Furthermore, 2015 was 
the year when considerable public attention had been attracted and immediate 
decisions had been taken as well.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. After an introduction of research 
question and methodology, the following chapter presents an overview of the 
subsequent and relevant literature on security-migration issue. Later, third chapter 
highlights the historical background in which migration was steadily approached to 
security. And the next chapter introduces and explains the CS securitization theory, 
deals with its theoretical foundation, key assumptions and some of the criticism it 
receives. The fifth chapter constitutes the empirical body of this study and tests the 
relevance of securitization theory on our case study of 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis. 
Finally, the last chapter concludes the main findings to discover whether and to 
what extend our analysis corresponds to the notion of securitization and evaluates 
the shortcomings of the methodology applied as well as suggestions for possible 
future research.  
  
                                                 
2 Emigrant is a person who leaves one country to settle permanently in another by variant reasons such as 
work, education or family reunion. 
Immigrant is a person who has moved into a new, foreign country. 
Irregular migrant is a person who, owing to irregular entry. 
Refugee is a person who flees conflict or persecution. He/She is defined and under protection of 
international law, and he/she must not be expelled or returned to situations where his/her life is at risk. 
Asylum-seeker is a person who has not yet received a decision on his/her claim for refugee status.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is plenty of academic debate regarding the security and migration 
studies respectively. Apart from that; the duality of threats, apparently caused by 
migration towards national sovereignty and human security are largely reflected 
specifically in much of the recent academic literature. From contemporary security 
studies, Boswell argues that since 1970’s migration started to become politicized, in 
which restrictive migration policy was prioritized regarding economic concerns. 
Huysman (1999: 8) also prompts that, “the most significant steps in the 
Europeanization of migration policy correlates with a growing consensus about the 
need to restrict migration”. Furthermore, he defines the third pillar on Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA), the Schengen Agreements and Dublin Convention as the clear 
indicators of securitizing the migration process. Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002: 21-39) 
are also among the scholars who present the core idea that the integration of Europe, 
migration and securitization are interrelated concepts. They develop the idea further 
by addressing to the widespread promotion of preventive and repressive migration 
policies. To Lazaridis and Wadia (2015), 9/11 marks a crucial moment of for 
European states to integrate more “securitization” into present migration regime. 
Watson (2009), shows that migration policy is not simply legislation but rather 
reflects the construction of a problem created by political elites. He further 
demonstrates how the securitization of migration produces real policy effects on 
inter-unit relations. In parallel with this, Guild (2009) presents an international 
political sociology perspective and opposes the idea that migration and security are 
strictly state-centric issues. Moreover, she sheds light on the jeopardy that 
promotion of migration by solely political actors and media has real social 
consequences on individuals from both local communities and migrants. In one of 
the few recent studies, while Ostrand (2015) illuminates the Migrant Crisis with 
data and concludes that the international community failed to respond to the refugee 
influx, Ruiz and Giménez (2017) indicate the symbiotic relationship between the 
securitization politics and capitalist market from a critical point of view and call 
attention to the gigantic trade between different public institutions (like ministries of 
internal affairs or defense) and private armament companies. Last but not least, 
Kleinschmidt (2006) argues that over the last two hundred years immigrants have 
been categorized as threats and the migration policy of the states was mostly 
dominated by the stereotype image of miserable immigrants. However; 21st century 
has been witnessing a “new migration”, which widens the definition of security 
actors and has new security demands. 
To sum up, there have been numerous studies to investigate security-
migration nexus and previous studies have almost exclusively focused on its 
negative aspects. The literature generally suggests that security concern is a vital 
element of migration policies. Although their analyses have met with general 
acceptance, there is still considerable uncertainty on the implication of securitization 
paradigm on an event with crisis nature which goes beyond state-level. 
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3. EVOLUTION OF EU SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE MIGRATION 
FIELD  
What we know about securitization of migration at EU level is limited due to 
lack of comprehensive knowledge regarding the historical background. This section 
is a preliminary attempt to provide further understanding for the inter-subjective 
construction of security in the migration field, which primarily rests and enacts on 
the previous experiences. There is vast amount of historical issues in the evolution 
of migration policy at European level; however, this study is not specifically 
designed to present the chronology of this kind of phenomenon. Therefore, the huge 
volume of information on the historical construction of security and migration 
dilemma at European level will be compressed and presented in short.   
Above all, political spill-over of migration has been drawn since the 1980s 
but the issue gained prominence in 2000s when migration became a crucial 
polarizing issue. Dichotomies between “natives and newcomers” in political 
discourse (Lazaridis and Wadia, op.cit., 2) and “portraying migration as an 
´inevitable´ battle of competing interests between ´us´ (citizens) and ´them´” 
(migrants) served as a perfect tool to politicize the question of migration (Stone, 
2012: 396). The more an issue is discussed, the more politicized it becomes. 
Eventually, more and more actors became involved in discussions. The purposive 
engagement of different actors in decision-making processes opens way to 
securitization –which will be discussed in the next chapter in depth- by challenging 
the status-quo and requiring new government decisions and resource allocations.3 
The migratory character of the EU Member States is heterogeneous; and 
Member States would be categorized roughly into four groups: the northern zone 
(Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) has been very dynamic 
in terms of migratory movements; the central zone (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Austria) is the main focus of immigration 
attraction that goes to Europe; the southern zone (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
has undergone a radical change, since it has turned into a transit destination from 
being a migrant provider region; and the Eastern zone (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania,) consists of 
Member States which are in favor of emigration rather than immigration (Martínez, 
2016: 61). Therefore, it is always a challenge to combine these diverse 
characteristics and interests in order to create a common migration policy at EU 
level.    
To achieve this, no other thing but security logic has been the amalgam of 
bringing diverse interests and characteristics of Member States in the migration area 
(Karyotis, 2007: 51). Subsequently, this perspective has always been reflected, re-
                                                 
3 In some cases, politicization of an issue does not necessarily equate with securitization. Such as 
humanitarian aids to third countries. However, it is always possible to link a politicized issue to security, 
since security is a very broad term, and encompasses a broad array of topics from health to environment, 
development and culture. Therefore, it is argued that politicization explicitly or implicitly supports 
securitization and always have the potential to start a securitization process at any time and point. 
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articulated, and further developed. The first initiatives in the 1970s, when there were 
changes in the labor market, favored the rights of the domestic workers vis-à-vis 
foreigners. A political rhetoric started to represent immigrants as competitors 
(Huymas, op.cit., 65). After mid1980s, the control of the borders shifted to the 
European level and the security acts were driven by a specific process of articulating 
new threats (Joppke, 2011: 18) due to dramatic increase of circulation of migrants 
and refugees within Europe. Immigration was linked to crime and the term 
“crimmigration”4 emerged.  
Following the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1990s, as civil conflicts and 
separatist movements caused large displacements of civil populations across Europe 
and the near abroad, the focus was shifted once again on migration policy. With the 
establishment of the European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the 
introduction of a chapter on asylum and migration in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), 
migration issue gained a significant momentum by containing more security aspects. 
A number of security-related institutions, rules and regulations were developed and 
the migration issue was elevated to the "high politics" (Carrascosa, 2018).  
Moreover, at Tampere European Council (1999), a five-year action plan, 
covering 1999–2004, called for a ‘common European asylum system’ and measures 
to stem irregular migration was concluded. And after the dramatic events of 9/11 
attacks (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings when the migration 
had been increasingly linked to terrorism, a new five-year (2005–2009) action plan 
(Hague Programme) was created to reaffirm the objective of creating a common 
European asylum system. Since then, the essence was moved from human rights to 
national security. When The Hague Programme was ended in 2009, Lisbon Treaty 
“normalized” the issue by assimilating the third pillar policies within the first one 
(European Communities). The importance of migration, asylum and border control 
is evident in the fact that they are presented just at the beginning of the Treaty 
(Article 2) and the objective was defined as the creation of common immigration 
and asylum policies (Article 63).  
All these initiatives over the past years reflected securitarian concerns and 
made migration and security inseparable or even “synonymous” to each other at EU 
level (Karamanidou, 2015: 50). Apparently, the manufactured spillover of the 
security in the EU policies for decades, extremely facilitated the securitization acts 
of migration during the 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis as well.       
4. SECURITIZATION THEORY 
Under International Relations discipline, the field of security studies has 
become one of the most debated areas and in line with the rise of new threats and 
challenges (e.g. environment, migration) new schools of thought -critical security 
studies- have emerged by the end of the Cold War. The new literature on security 
                                                 
4 A term coined by law professor Juliet Stumpf to reflect the intersection of crime and migration. 
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became clearly noticeable by a shared interest towards the social construction of 
security, and this constructivist way of conceptualizing security is mostly associated 
with the Copenhagen School (CS).  
The theoretical foundation of the CS is primarily attributed to Barry Buzan’s 
1983 book “People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International 
Relations” and Ole Wæver´s 1989 Working Paper “Security, the Speech Act: 
Analyzing the Politics of a Word”. It worked out more systematically later by 
Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, who combined their work in a book called “Security, 
A New Framework for Analysis” in 1998. CS contributed to the present-day 
security studies by offering an innovative mindset on broad spectrum of security 
concept which is mostly based on social-constructivism. According to this, 
securitization is a process in which a normal or typical political issue is altered to a 
security threat through speech acts.  
The security analysis paradigm proposed by the CS, develops the concept of 
sectors and widens the traditional understanding of security by adding new sectors 
(Buzan and Wæver, 2003). In other words, “extends the definition of security 
‘horizontally’ to include political, economic, environmental, military and societal 
sectors and ‘vertically’ to include referent objects such as the individuals and the 
groups” (Wæver, 2004: 9). However, it performs it precisely in a balancing way 
between two opposing positions of “the wideners” who want to include new 
dimensions to military security and “the traditionalists” who warn against the risk of 
a conceptual dilution that security would mean anything (Rothe, 2016: 36).  
The core assumption of the CS is “securitization” concept which suggests 
that the objectivity or reality of the threat is not under question, but rather its socio-
political construction through speech acts matters with the purpose of ensuring the 
public consent (Buzan et.al., 36). In this regard, securitization is a process between 
three realms: Threat, securitizing actor and audience. For that reason, these notions 
need to be clarified first. 
Threat is portrayal of certain issues as something extremely hazardous to the 
existence of the referent object. Here, the referent object can either be the state, the 
nation, the nature, or the culture etc. Therefore, the survival and maintenance of this 
referent object should be a top priority for a large portion of the population in 
question.  
Secondly, the securitizing actor plays a pivotal role in the securitization 
process. Even though politicians, bureaucrats, media and interest groups may all be 
securitizing actors, it is often expected that the main actor must be in a position of 
authority. In practice, securitization actor can either be an individual, an 
organization, or an institution and different actors may always have different 
thresholds for defining the threat and counter methodologies to eliminate them 
(Balzacq, 2005: 191-193). A security argument always involves two predictions: 
“What will happen if we do not take security action and what will happen if we do” 
(Buzan et.al., 32). By depicting a threat, the securitizing actor often claims and 
exaggerates that someone cannot deal with it in the normal way (Buzan et.al., 25-
26).  
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Securitization is an inter-subjective context, since interpretation of the threat 
is negotiated between the securitizing actor and the relevant audience (Stritzel, 
2007: 363). After all, the audience is expected to accept the threat as such in order 
to match the defining characteristics of securitization. When there are no signs of 
such acceptance exists, it is only possible to talk about a securitizing move, but an 
uncompleted securitization process. Paradoxically, the success of securitization is 
heavily dependent on the audience, rather than the securitizing actors. Here, the 
main question is: “Does the audience agree that something is an existential threat to 
their shared value?” (ibid., 31). 
Since securitization is an inter-subjective and socially-constructed process, 
special attention needs to be paid on “speech acts”, because speech acts are at the 
hearth of the securitization operation. Wæver (1995: 55) points out that security is 
equated with speech act and “by saying it something is done”. Solely through 
discourse, a securitization actor asserts that an existential threat requires special 
treatments, which may surpass standard procedures. “Conditions for a successful 
speech act fall into two categories: the internal, linguistic, and grammatical to 
follow the rules of the act and the external, contextual and social to hold a position 
from which the acts can be derived” (Buzan, et.al., 32).  
Securitization studies aims to gain a precise understanding of whether certain 
actions “fulfill the security criteria”. Being more specific; Have the securitizing 
actor managed to mobilize support? Who is the audience and what are the 
facilitating conditions? Have extraordinary actions been taken? And what might be 
the impact of such securitizing acts on other units? (ibid., 33-35). 
 
Table 1: Encapsulating the Securitization Theory 
 
Last but not least, it might be necessary to underline the fact that CS regards 
securitization as a negative concept, as it permits actors to break democratic rules to 
deal with a socially-constructed “monsters”. Therefore, CS favors de-securitization, 
by moving issues “out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process 
of the political sphere” (ibid., 4). 
Despite its systematic conceptualization of security, securitization paradigm 
receives several critics too. First of all, it is only applicable to Western liberal 
democracies, due to the role of the audience. Furthermore, the role of mass media 
and social media (especially in terms of visuality) in the securitization process is 
largely ignored, despite the fact that they may accelerate the securitization process. 
Another critic comes about the societal security concept. McSweeny (1999) argues 
Securitization
Speech Acts:
Portraying certain issues, 
as existential threats by 
securitizing actors.
Inter-subjectivity: 
Approval or rejection of 
the audience for the need 
for immediate actions. 
Rule-breaking: Adoption 
of extraordinary 
measures to counter the 
threat.
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that by defining society in terms of a single identity, the securitization notion risks 
fostering and legitimizing intolerance between identity groups. In addition to that, 
Williams (2003) draws attention to the ethics of securitization and emphasizes the 
risk of securitizing irrational politics through speech acts and Huysman (1999) 
indicates the paradoxical fact that writing or speaking security already makes the 
analyst executing a speech act. Furthermore, the CS does not provide any 
framework about either the threats can be justified or not. Besides, securitization 
theory also receives critics from Diez and Squirem (2008) who assert that one of the 
shortfalls of the securitization theory lies under the ambiguity of corresponding to 
whether or not particular groups or individuals serve as security ‘threat’. In addition, 
they claim that facts as a whole are not securitized, instead certain forms are 
subjected to securitization. Another critic can be found in Olesker´s study (2018). 
To Olesker, legitimacy is a source of power between the political elites and the 
audience during the approval of threats and their immediate nature, however; he 
reaches the conclusion that “the literature on securitization provides little 
clarification on the significance of ´legitimacy´ and how it operates in the 
securitization process”. Some others also suggest how securitization is a far more 
complicated process than it seems. For instance Bourbeau (2011: 18) states that 
securitization is not a binary notion, but rather is a scattered inter-action process. 
Bourbeau also questions the ambiguity of the description of audience, despite its 
important role in the securitization process. The theory does not answer the 
questions like “What is a sufficient audience?” or “How to measure it?” (ibid., 41). 
Ultimately, McDonald (2008: 565) asserts that securitization theory makes too little 
explanation on discourse analysis and the way in which speech act is constructed 
and developed. 
All in all, securitization is a more extreme version of politicization, where 
several policy areas are taken beyond the established frameworks (Buzan et.al., 24-
25). Accordingly, securitization theory seeks to analyze the process of how an issue 
from a non-politicized or politicized area transfers to security area, how it becomes 
an existential threat via speech acts by security actors and how it convince the 
audience for accepting extra-ordinary measures to be taken. And it is mainly 
criticized for its simplified conceptualizations and exclusion of non-discursive acts 
from the theory. However, securitization theory provides important revenue for 
researches studying security, by moving the gravity of analysis away from merely 
material factors to social-political ones and depicting the process of inter-subjective 
construction of security between securitizing actor and audience in relation to a 
threat. 
This chapter has provided insight into the CS securitization theory and 
explained the actors, conditions and stages of a securitization process. For a 
complete securitization, a securitizing move has to be initiated by the securitizing 
actor and has to be accepted by the target audience. This happens by speech acts and 
an issue moves into immediate security realm from a politicized or even non-
politicized area. Ultimately, although it is not compulsory for a successful 
securitization, use of extra-ordinary measures has to be approved as well.  
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5. SECURITIZATION PRACTISE DURING THE 2015 EUROPE MIGRANT 
CRISIS 
As this study is particularly interested in 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis, a short 
introduction is required. The background of the crisis goes back to the March, 2011, 
when the political instability and increased sectarian violence in Syria erupted and 
resulted with more than a quarter-million of deaths and 4.5 millions of refugees.5 As 
the Syrian government was unwilling or unable to protect the citizens, high numbers 
of individuals were forced to leave their homes.  
Although the international refugee system was created on the shared 
understanding that refugees are subjected to universal norms and rules and it is the 
common responsibility of the global society to take necessary measures, neither the 
Arab countries nor industrialized countries (e.g. USA, Russia, Israel, Japan, and 
South Korea) offered any resettlement places. Proximity to the region, its political 
and economic stability, and the false image that Europe pursues open-door 
migration policy resulted with over 1 million irregular migrants in a single year.   
Despite the crucial distinction between a migrant and a refugee, while 
migrants are subject to the receiving country's immigration laws and the refugees 
are processed under the 1951 Refugee Convention and entitled to basic rights under 
international law,6 the terminologies were blurred with the “extra-ordinary people 
movement towards Europe in 2015”. To cut a long story short, European response 
came immediately but insufficiently.7 Matthias Ruete´s, Director General of the 
Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission, 
summary is crystal-clear that the EU is facing an 'unprecedented crisis' with 
'unprecedented' flows of refugees and migrants for which the 'current system was 
                                                 
5 The majority of refugees took shelter in Syria’s neighbouring countries (Approx. 3 million in Turkey, 1 
million in Lebanon, 650,000 in Jordan. However, the number of asylum applications in the EU-28 
exceeded 1,2 million as well. “Asylum Applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2008–2018” 
(2019). Eurostat. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics> 
(Accessed at 01.09.2016).  
6 International Refugee Law is a part of international humanitarian law. According to Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (Article 14/1) “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.” Plus, 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (that lifts the time and geographic limits of the 1951 
Convention) reflect the basis of the international refugee regime which are binding upon the signatory 
States. According to this, refugees not only have the right to physical safety, but also should receive at 
least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including certain 
fundamental entitlements of every individual. (Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee 
Law (2017). The UN Refugee Agency,  
<http://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d4aba564/refugee-protection-guide-international-refugee-law-
handbook-parliamentarians.html> (Accessed at 01.08.2016). 
7 When a number of boats sank in the Mediterranean Sea, with the loss of more than 1,300 migrants in 
April 2015, a special meeting was held by the European Council on 23.04.2015, and it was agreed to 
strengthening the presence at sea, fighting traffickers, preventing illegal migratory flows and reinforcing 
internal solidarity and responsibility. European Council (2015).  
 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23-special-euco-statement/> 
(Accessed at 01.08.2016). 
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not designed' (2015 EMN Conference). Even though EU laws (Dublin Regulation) 
state that “asylum seekers must remain in the first European country they enter and 
that country is solely responsible for examining migrants' asylum applications”, in 
practice it became ineffective as several EU Member States (Greece, Italy etc.) 
received the largest number of incoming requests due to their external borders. 
Eventually, a huge institutional chaos came out since the existing norms and rules 
are incompetent and inadequate to deal with sharply increased flow of migration. 
The situation was imprecisely called as "Europe Migrant Crisis" or "Europe 
Refugee Crisis". Here the word “crisis” became a common rhetoric as it indicates a 
difficult or dangerous situation that needs serious attention. Conforming this, as 
discussed in previous chapters although migration and security were interconnected 
at EU level for a long period of time, migration had been largely stayed as still a 
bureaucratic issue, until it became a fundamental security issue in 2015, not 
necessarily because of its nature, but because it was presented as such. 
The securitization initiatives of Migrant Crisis are considered to be run in 
order to cope with sudden refugee influx, to by-pass the disaster scenarios produced 
by media and far-right political parties and to cool down the public opinion. Broadly 
speaking, as shown in the previous section, securitization has two phases: 
Portraying the referent object as threat and convincing the audience to accept the 
implementation of extra-ordinary measures.  
Based on the constructivist ontology, securitization needs the pioneering role 
of the security actors. In this regard, -political elites- performed the leading role 
since they had power to spread uneasiness among the society. Consequently, a 
number of non-state actors such as political opposition, the Church, the academia, 
grassroots movements, and the media became other securitization actors within their 
capacity to mobilize the public opinion. As a result, a multi-actor based 
securitization process took place with the aim of creating a perception of immediate 
threat and it is implied that the securitization process is not against the traditional 
vision of security, but rather serves it better (Revelo, 2018: 58-69).  
The conception of securitization rested on the discursive framing of 
migration as a boogie and in this regard, irregular migrants were presented as posing 
an existential threat to three vital domains: national security, welfare system, and 
identity. Here, “speech acts” let the migration question gain popularity in public 
debates and provoke unfavorable sentiments towards new arrivals (Ceyhan and 
Tsoukala, op.cit., 22).  
“Something becomes a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” 
(Wæver, op.cit., 6). Checking the migration discourse of several decision-makers in 
the EU and Member States, it was visible that its humanitarian aspects were largely 
ignored, but security aspects were strategically polished. Because, “a securitizing 
speech act needs to follow a specific rhetorical structure, derived from war and its 
historical connotations of survival, urgency, threat, and defense” (Munster, 2012). 
Therefore, theory of securitization, as originally proposed by the CS, shall be 
applied to analyze the language used by mainstream European politicians and 
officials. This practice will show how the speeches of powerful individuals were 
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built upon aggressive, threatening and intolerant discourse. Frankly speaking there 
is abundance of speech acts regarding this phenomenon, but only a few were 
included in this study to save more space to the rest of the analysis. To start with, 
President of the EU Council Donald Tusk addressed to the risk that the crisis had 
the potential to destroy the Union (Deutschewelle, 2015) and the European 
Parliament President Martin Schulz warned that Europe hasn't failed yet, but the 
situation is extremely concerning (Spiegel Online, 2015). European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker also mentioned the emergency situation (European 
Parliament, 2015), so did the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, who described the migrant crisis as “not 
only a humanitarian emergency but also a security crisis” (The Telegraph, 2015). 
Beside, First Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans stated 
that “every single European” will feel the consequences of the crisis (Euroactiv, 
2015). And not only the EU officials but also the leading political figures of EU 
Member States used an antagonistic language as well. Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban, positioned migration as a threat to the Europe’s survival (The 
Guardian, 2015a), and the Czech President Milos Zeman defined the crisis as “an 
organized invasion” of Europe and claimed that European culture was being 
exposed to the risk of oppression by a foreign culture (The New Observer, 2015). 
The Foreign Minister of one of the six founding members of the Union –
Luxembourg- alerted that the crisis could cause the collapse of the EU and could 
even trigger a war (TRT World, 2015). Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi urged 
for the need of an EU-wide solidarity and “blackmailed” the rest of Europe that, 
otherwise Italy´s plan B would hurt whole continent (The Guardian, 2015b). Many 
other European politicians referred to “threat” in their discourse as well. While 
Jorge Fernandez Diaz, Spain’s Minister for Internal Affairs claimed that the “terror 
threat” was increased (Press, 2015), Poland’s leader of the ruling party Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski speculated about how refugees would bring parasites and diseases to the 
local populations (Huffington Post, 2015). Slovenian Prime Minister Miro Cerar 
mentioned that in an extreme situation the borders would eventually have to be 
defended with wire, the police, and even with the army (About Croatia News, 
2015). Besides, Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated that “We must 
go further than fine rhetoric, warm feelings and the many likes on Facebook. We 
must commit each other to action. Also further down the line” (Danish Prime 
Ministry, 2015). Some politicians used natural catastrophic metaphors in their 
discourse too. When the German Finance Minister associated the refugee flow with 
avalanche (The Local, 2015), a British deputy of the parliament equated it with 
tsunami (The Guardian, 2015c). All these quotes show how the “speech act” of the 
security actors (re)defined the security by providing a powerful vector for extra 
“dramatizing” the threat (Buzan et.al., 26). Apparently, three sequential elementary 
speech acts were used respectively (Vuori, 2008: 77-79):  
 Claim: Something is an existential threat. 
 Warning: The threat is realized soon, if something is not done. 
 Demand: Something should be done. 
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Additionally, media functioned as a transmitter of hate speech and discourse, 
and migration was increasingly inter-twined with criminal activities such as 
terrorism, human smuggling, sexual assaults, theft and vandalism. Unsurprisingly, 
migration was much more associated with insecurity, in the aftermath of the 
Copenhagen shootings in February and Paris terror attacks in November 2015, and 
the media acted as a main actor to stigmatize the migrants by using a particular form 
of framing perceptions. The investigations reveal that press coverage in all Member 
States featured anti-migrant perspective throughout the crisis (Georgiou and 
Zaborowski, 2017) and this helped to create a perception that migration and 
insecurity are synonymous to each other.   
Speech act was also performed in official documents too. Whilst it is not 
possible within this study to analyse every single documentation regarding the given 
policy area, the ones that have been selected below are subjected to a critical 
discourse analysis8 to demonstrate the most common themes used throughout the 
EU documentation. While checking up the discourse used in official documents, the 
emphasis is given on special wordings such as: security, immigration, false, illegal, 
European values, solidarity, fake, and terrorist. Words that are particularly used to 
provoke insecurity among the public are highlighted. In May 2015, the European 
Commission presented an ambitious set of solutions with the purpose of ensuring 
security at home and at borders, and managing migration more effectively: A 
European Agenda on Migration. Roughly, the document was divided into three 
chapters, in which short term and medium term objectives were defined, and four 
pillars approach to manage migration was identified. While taking into account the 
fact that even the articulation of the word “security” does something, a complex 
security language was carefully used throughout the text. First of all, there were two 
references to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in the document, which 
clearly links the military combat to the threat (migration). The term “immediate 
actions” moves the threat (migration) into a category which needs a quick response. 
Ultimately, the repetitive use of criminal terminology in the text, served to portray 
the migration and migrants together with illegal acts, which eventually calls the 
need for effective security measures.  
 
  
                                                 
8 Discourse analysis is the methodology used to highlight the masked meanings and socio-political 
consequences in a given speech or text that are constructed by the discourse. For further information: 
Jørgensen, M.W. & Phillips, L. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: Sage 
Publications. 
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Table 2: The Linguistic-Grammatical Form in the Text 
The Term with crime connotations # of use in the text 
Immediate 14 
Criminal  14 
Smuggling/Smuggler 29 
Illegal 7 
Risk 7 
Abuse 3 
Beside the securitizing actor and their speech acts, CS introduces another 
actor in the securitization process: the audience. When the securitizing actors use 
speech act to convince (or manipulate) a significant portion of audience, in the end, 
it is the relevant audience to accept or refuse this securitizing move. Therefore, the 
audience has primary role to define the success of the securitizing move. And as 
Dover argues, the essential reality is “what the public opinion is” apart from 
whether the security concerns are realistic or not (Dover, 2008: 118-130). Due to 
lack of clear definition of the audience and the exact relationship between the actor 
and the audience in the securitization theory, the study analyzed the results of the 
EU-wide public opinion survey. Having a closer look to the Eurobarometer 
statistics of Autumn 2015, almost 90% of the respondents reported that they agree 
with the additional measures in order to fight with the illegal immigration. 
Furthermore, the vast majority (68%) of the Europeans expressed their support for 
taking additional measures at either European or both national and European levels. 
This also means a 2% increase in public support for adopting new security 
measures, comparing to the previous survey held in Spring 2015. These figures 
precisely confirm that the audience seemed to accept the securitizing move.  
Table 3: Public Support for Actions towards Irregular Migration  
Question: Should additional measures be taken to fight against illegal immigration of 
people from the outside of the EU? (%) 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Yes. At
EU Level
Yes. At
National
Level
Yes. At
Both
Levels
No
Need/No
Answer
30 19 36 1132 21 36 7
Spring 2015
Autumn 2015
Source: Eurobaromer Surveys 
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In addition, many far-right (radical) populist political parties9 with anti-
immigration agendas made notable gains in elections throughout Europe in 2015, 
which might be regarded as another indicative that a significant portion of the 
European population support the securitization of migration by even more 
restrictive and harsh anti-immigrant policy implementations.   
 
Table 4: Vote Share of Far Right Populist Political Parties in General Elections in 2015  
EU 
Country Political Party 
Share of Vote 
in the 
Previous 
Elections 
Share of Vote 
in the 2015 
Elections 
Share of 
Change 
Denmark Danish People´s Party 12.3 21.1 +  8,8 
United 
Kingdom The UK Independence Party - 12.7 + 12,7 
Finland Finns Party 19 17.7 -   1,3 
France National Front 13.6 27.7 + 14,1 
Greece Golden Down 7,5 7 -  0,5 
Poland Law and Justice Party 29,9 37,6 + 7,7 
 + 6,9 
Source: Aisch, G. Pearce, A & Rousseau, B. “How Far Is Europe Swinging to the Right?” 
(2017).  
 
Far right political parties contributed to the securitization process as 
periphery actors, by encouraging agents to make further security speech acts and to 
move beyond daily policy practices. And their power of influencing the decision-
makers was coming from their steadily increasing popular votes, which has an 
average of slightly less than 7% increase in seven EU member states which had 
general elections during the Europe Migrant Crisis in 2015.    
And finally, CS does not mention the adoption of emergency measures as a 
must for a complete securitization move, and only asks the consensus of subjects 
(Securitizing actor and audience) which makes it possible to legitimize emergency 
measures when it needs (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998). If there are measures 
that go beyond the usual practices, then they constitute the final step of the 
securitization process. However, what constitutes an extra-ordinary measure is not 
clearly defined and therefore extra-ordinary measures would be evaluated as the 
unusual paradigm of the political realm (Emmers, 2006: 135). As a response to 2015 
                                                 
9 Above all, radical right political parties do not define themselves as radical right. Nevertheless, despite 
their significant differences and background, all have a common rhetoric with strong populist elements, 
in which immigration jeopardizes state and societal security. In any case, this is a subject which goes 
beyond the scope of this study and here, it is considered as an indirect indicator of public support for 
securitization of migration. 
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Europe Migrant Crisis, the most speculatively, a decision on relocating 160,00010 
migrants to the Member States with a total budget of €780 million was taken. 
Moreover, it was stated that if a Member State cannot temporarily participate totally 
or in part in a relocation decision, it will be asked to make a financial contribution to 
the EU budget of an amount of 0.002% of its GDP. Also, implementation of a 
hotspot approach (An immediate support of EU Agencies (European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO), European Border and Coast Guard Agency-EBCG, 
Frontex, and Europol) to the border countries facing highest number of migrant 
arrivals, was decided under the generic title of “combating irregular immigration” in 
“A European Agenda on Migration”. Furthermore, EU interior ministers have 
agreed to execute several rules to suspend the passport-free travel in the Schengen 
zone when it needs (Financial Times, 2019). It became beyond doubt that migrants 
were regarded as threat, rather than needing to be protected. Following instructions 
by the European Council, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EU 
NAVFOR Med), and a naval operation was launched in the Mediterranean Sea and 
the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) was decided. 
Additionally, the Commission initiated to establish a European Border and Coast 
Guard to facilitate the effective management of the external borders, to increase 
security within the Schengen area, and to introduce mandatory systematic checks of 
EU citizens at external land, sea, and air borders (European Council, 2015).  
Eventually, a series of diplomatic attempts at international level were 
simultaneously put into effect as well. The European Commission announced a 
proposal for a regulation establishing an EU common list of safe countries of origin 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Turkey, and adding an annotation that others may be added in the future), which 
has an objective of regulating the swift processing of asylum applications from 
persons originating from countries designated as safe (European Commission, 
2015). The regulation was addressing to the common EU procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection, with an objective of standardizing the 
asylum and border procedures of EU member states. Furthermore, the geographic 
limits of the counter-migration measures were extended to the non-EU countries by 
transforming them into so-called border-guards. For example, New Partnership 
Framework with Third Countries policy was initiated first in October 2015, with the 
aim of saving lives at sea, preventing illegal migration, enhancing cooperation with 
third countries on returns and readmission of irregular migrants, linking migration 
and development policies and fostering investments in partner countries. In line 
with this, an international summit on migration between the EU, and the African 
and other key countries concerned was held in Valletta (Malta) in November 2015 
to create a common platform for promoting and organizing further international 
cooperation in the migration field. Plus, the EU and Turkey agreed on a joint action 
                                                 
10 The Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted in September 2015 two Decisions to relocate 120.000 
+ 40.000 (160,000 asylum seekers) from Italy and Greece to the member states based on Commission 
proposals. In the framework of the second implementation package (September 2015) Czechia, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia voted against the EU proposal to relocate 120,000 migrants. 
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plan, in which the EU is committed to provide an initial €3 billion to assist Turkey 
with the condition to keep Syrian refugees away from EU territories (European 
Council, 2015). Also within the EU, a total of €2 billion were allocated to a Member 
State –Greece- to help it cope with the migrant crisis in its territories. The allocation 
of financial assistance was designed not only from the “Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund”, but also from the “Internal Security Fund” which shows an extra 
evidence of securitization of the migration as well (European Stability Initiative, 
2019).  
Besides supra-national level, security actors were enabled to take exceptional 
measures at national level too. Labeling migration as an alert issue resulted with 
tangible implications in the relevant policies, regulations and laws. In this regard, 
for example, greater surveillance, detention, and more restrictive policies were 
introduced (Koser, 2011). One of the most contested measures was building fences 
and walls, like much of the previous Iron Curtain. While Bulgaria announced its 
own plan for constructing a border fence with its Turkish border and Estonia 
announced its own wall with Russia, Hungary had already finished building fences 
at the Croatian and Serbian borders. Additionally, Hungary adopted a new series of 
“martial laws”, which allowed its law enforcement units to operate in detention 
centers and its military forces to use non-lethal weapons against migrants. The 
government also deployed armed troops to its border (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2015). Furthermore, the Schengen arrangements which are commonly assumed as 
the starting point of linking security to migration were temporarily suspended by a 
number of EU Member States and national border controls were re-introduced by 
Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark. These are just some of the extraordinary 
measures that were taken by the EU and Member States to overwhelm the refugee 
crisis in short and medium term. Eventually, police, army and security forces were 
emerged as key actors in the migration field in whole Europe, and the Migrant 
Crisis demonstrated that nation states were willing to practice “self-help”, when 
they suppose that EU was not quick of doing so. 
This section has shown how a progressive securitizing move occurred in the 
proceedings of Europe Migrant Crisis in 2015. Although relatively small number of 
irregular migrants looked for shelter in the EU countries compared with in 
neighboring countries like Turkey and Lebanon, the issue rapidly turned into a 
Europe-wide crisis and immediately securitized by the securitizing actors through a 
series of speech acts, which convinced the significant number of audience about the 
need for adopting immediate and extra-ordinary counter-migration measures. To put 
it differently; the securitization occurred as a result of a social-construction process, 
Migrant Crisis was framed around an issue of security, rather than humanitarian 
perspective and moved from the realm of “daily” politics to that of an exceptional 
issue posing an existential threat to Europe.11 Adapting our findings to the 
                                                 
11 It is noteworthy that, Ole Wæver indicates a “gray zone” between normal and extra-ordinary politics 
which requiries further investigation and adds that there is also need for additional work on partial 
securitization issue. Wæver, O. “Securitisation: Taking Stock of a Research programme in Security 
Studies” (2003). Unpublished manuscript. Available at: 
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securitization concept of the Copenhagen School as defined as the following: 
“Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain 
an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes (Politicians at national 
and EU level), on what issues (Migration), for whom (Nation States, the EU and 
the European people), why (For survival), with what results (Actors reached a 
consensus for the adoption of practices beyond the normal political realm) and, 
not least, under what conditions (Securitization is much more successful under the 
crisis conditions)” (Buzan et.al., 32).  
6. CONCLUSION 
Security is a contentious concept used under several disciplines and its 
various definitions have been competing with each other in order to catch the 
essence of the word. The CS provides a distinct reading of security through a theory 
called “securitization”. In this regard, the question of “whether and how migration -
a non-traditional security sector- has been evoked and transformed as a high priority 
security issue at European level in 2015” could be solved by examining the 
processes of securitization. By all means, adopting a securitization framework 
evokes presenting subjectivity of security and its socio-political construction.  
Linking migration with security issue has a relatively long history in Europe. 
But the arrival of over one million displaced people to the EU countries in a single 
year triggered certain policy orientations. In that sense, the securitization of 
migration policy, put differently, conceptualization of migration as a security issue 
became a prominent debate. Bringing the migration issue into the public space led 
the involvement of more political and security actors to the debate and finally 
opened the gate to securitize the migration issue in the EU, by challenging the 
status-quo and requiring new government decisions and resource allocations. 
Considering the five sectors determined by the securitization theory: the economic, 
the societal, the military, the political and the environmental sector; migration is 
presented as a cross-sectoral threat to the identity, economy and the political 
stability of Europe.  
The answer to the first sub question (Did a securitizing move occur within 
the 2015 Europe Migrant Crisis?), it is investigated whether the political leaders in 
Europe articulated and designated of a threat since a securitization move cannot be 
realized without an initiative of securitizing actors. And it is discovered that several 
speech acts performed by the European leaders presented the threat as the migration 
itself. Especially, the portrayal of migrants as, euphemistically speaking, 
“undesirable” became more pronounced in public discourse by the migrant influx to 
the EU. The speech acts promoted the ‘us vs. them’ thinking, and provoked the 
survival instinct. In order to convince the audience to go beyond standard political 
measures, the urgency and the level of the threat was often exaggerated by those 
                                                                                                                  
https://docplayer.net/62037981-Securitisation-taking-stock-of-a-research-programme-in-security-
studies.html 
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securitizing actors. Therefore, it is easy to figure out that a securitizing move had 
occurred. However, the success of the move is determined by looking at whether the 
move was accepted by the target audience or not. Hence, a second sub-question was 
formulated as: Was the securitizing move accepted by the target audience, provided 
a move had occurred. 
The analysis of the securitization of migration during the 2015 Europe 
Migrant Crisis so far suggests that; as those particular messages were transmitted to 
the audience successfully; the securitizing move was accepted by the target 
audience according to the results of the public polls. Confirming this, large 
percentage of the populations showed their willingness for a transformation in 
existing policies. Questioning the role of audience also helped us to understand how 
security is an affirmative and inter-subjective process between different actors.  
Taken together, it is seen that the migration question of 2015 was 
successfully securitized in the EU. But although the execution of extraordinary 
measures is not indispensable for a successful act of securitization, it is further 
questioned whether emergency actions were also put into effect. The answer was 
not surprising. As the issue of migration is re-constructed and re-articulated by a 
strict security language persistently, the doors for counter-measures out of the usual 
political realms were opened with the purpose of “surviving” Europe, which 
otherwise would have met with greater resistance. During the 2015 Europe Migrant 
Crisis, security concerns justified suspending old rules, launching new procedures, 
and reallocating massive resources.  
Based on the positive results of the sub-research questions, this study 
concluded that migration -a non-traditional security sector- has been evoked and 
transformed as a high priority security issue at European level in 2015 through a 
complete and successful securitization move.  
Obviously, the Crisis facilitated the conditions for securitization, and beside 
that, securitization theory provided a sophisticated and systematic approach to 
analyze how extremely politicized issues could evolve into security issues. In 
addition, thanks to the CS approach it was seen that security is not neutral or 
objective, but rather it is a socially constructed concept by inter-subjective 
interactions. But it is also important to mention the limits and the deficiencies of the 
theory. First of all, one of the tough challenges for all researchers is lack of a clear 
methodology and a standardized format of the theory. Secondly, there is too much 
emphasis on speech acts but no analytical tool is described to show how to run the 
analysis. Furthermore, the exact relationship between the securitizing actor and the 
audience remain enigmatic, and the description of the audience is vague. Moreover, 
the theory is ambiguous in terms of addressing to extraordinary measures.  
By way of reconciling securitization theory with its critics, further studies 
could analyze more on different aspects of speech acts, the qualification of inter-
subjective relations and where the separation line goes between the ordinary and the 
extra-ordinary security measures.  
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